Indemnity Act of 1863 a Study in the War-Time Immunity of Governmental Officers by Randall, James G
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 20 Issue 6 
1922 
Indemnity Act of 1863 a Study in the War-Time Immunity of 
Governmental Officers 
James G. Randall 
Urbana, Illinois 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, 
Jurisdiction Commons, Legislation Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, President/Executive 
Department Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James G. Randall, Indemnity Act of 1863 a Study in the War-Time Immunity of Governmental Officers, 20 
MICH. L. REV. 589 (1922). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol20/iss6/10 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE INDEMNITY ACT OF I863: A STUDY IN THE WAR-
TIME IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENTAL OFFICERS 
I 
0 NE of the familiar measures of the Union administration · during the Civil War was the suspension of the habeas corpus 
privilege and the consequent subjection of civilians to military 
authority. The essential irregularity of such a situation in Amer-
ican law is especially conspicuous when one considers its inevitable 
sequel-namely, the protection of military and civil officers from 
such prosecution as would normally follow invasion of private 
rights and actual injury of persons and property. Such protection 
was supplied by a bill of indemnity passed in I863, and this law, 
with its amendment of I866, forms a significant chapter in the 
legal history of the period. 
In order to understand this sweeping grant of official immunity, 
one should bear in mind the trying circumstances which surrounded 
the officers of the federal government in the exercise of their 
unwonted authority. The suspension order was that of the Presi-
dent, not the Congress. There was no body of laws to cover the 
situation and it was out of the question to expect a complete and 
comprehensive system of legislation to be passed within the limits 
of the Constitution that would supply a sanction for the numerous 
arrests, seizures and imprisonments to which officers in discharge 
of their proper functions were forced to resort. Orders and procla-
mations of the President afforded a basis for most of the acts 
involved, but, without some further support, even these orders 
might prove a flimsy protection where trespasses were committed, 
in view of the well-known principle that no legal justification can 
be derived from the command of a superior wrong-doer. Officers 
were placed in the unfortunate position where their highest duty 
demanded that they should do many things without waiting for the. 
slow, uncertain and obstructive course of the law: 
The fact that the courts were "still open" in communities where 
military officers were in COffi!11and does not signify that the courts 
could effectively control the situation. Where disloyal practices 
were indulged in by large numbers of the citizens the ordinary 
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workings of justice might easily have permitted disaster to befall 
the government in its struggle for preservation. Something more 
than the mere existence of the courts was necessary: their effec-
tiveness for the emergency was the essential point. Unless one 
assumes that the administration's policy was altogether arbitrary, 
the fact that a military officer was clothed with extraordinary 
powers suggests that the situation was sufficiently abnormal to be 
beyond the control of the judicial authorities. 
By the ordinary application of the principles of American admin-
istrative law, officers guilty of trespasses (such as false imprison-
ment and unwarranted seizures) would .stand unprotected, though 
the trespasses might consist only of the absence of ordinary judi-
cial sanction and might be in strict keeping with executive orders. 
It is a well-known principle of our law that governmental officers 
(with -the possible exception of judges who are removable by 
impeachment and otherwise independent) are liable in damages for 
offi~ial conduct which results in private injuries, and are subject to 
prosecution in case such conduct bears a criminal character. 1 In 
this respect the pijnciples of American and English law differ rad-
ically from the administrative law of Europe. The essence of the 
continental system is to give personal immunity to officers acting 
under authority, and to accord distinct and separate treatment to 
official cases in special "administrative courts." Under American 
and other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, however, any governmental 
officer who injures private rights, either by omission or commission, 
is, with but a few qualifications, subject to civil or criminal action 
precisely as an ordinary citizen would be. 2 This liability of gov-
1 "Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, in our government, is 
amenable to the laws for an injury done to individuals. * * * It is a funda-
mental principle in our government that no individual, whether in or out 
of office, is above the law. * * * There are three grounds on which a public 
officer may be held responsible to an injured party. (1) Where ha refuses 
to do a ministerial act over which he can exercise no discretion. (2) Where 
he does an act which is clearly not within his jurisdiction. (3) Where he 
acts wilfully, maliciously and unjustly * * * within his jurisdiction." Ken-
dall v. Stokes et al., 44 U. S. 792, 794. 
2 For an instance in which the President himself was subjected to an 
action for damages, one may turn to the case of Livingston v. Jefferson. 
In 18u an action for trespass was brought before the circuit court of 
Virginia , against "Thomas Jefferson, a citizen of Virginia." The fact that 
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ernmental agents is but one phase of the Anglo-Saxon principle 
that governments are not above law, and that an officer of the gov-
ernment is not given a privileged character superior to that of the 
common man. All this would mean that, unless some special pro-
tection were provided for cases arising during the war many officers 
would be sued or prosecuted for acts which in the large sense were 
not theirs at all, but those of the government. 
For these reasons it has long been customary in England to fol-
low up a proclamation of martial law, or a suspension of the habeas 
corpus privilege, with an act of indemnity with retroactive effect, 
affording judicial protection to those agents of the government 
who, though acting in good faith, were guilty of breaches of pri-
vate rights. Following the ·suspension of the Habeas Corptts Act 
in r793, Parliament passed in 1801 an a,ct indemnifying and shield-
ing all who had made summary arrests for treason, and relieving 
them of the responsibility that would usually ha~e followed such 
arrests.3 Another bill of indemnity was passed in 1817 to protect 
officers who had arrested on suspicion and who had made seizures 
without legal process. 
Before the Civil War had proceeded far in the United States it 
became evident that federal officers, even of cabinet rank, were 
being attacked in state courts for acts done in the performance of 
duty. One of the earliest cases of this sort was that of Pierce 
Butler, of Philadelphia, against Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 
Butler was arrested by order of Cameron in August, 1861, on sus-
picion of having received a commission from the Confederacy, and 
was confined for about a month in Fort Lafayette, after which he 
was released by order of Secretary Seward on giving a pledge of 
loyalty. On Butler's petition the supreme court of Pennsylvania 
issued a writ which was served upon Cameron when he was about 
to sail as minister to Russia, the plea being assault and battery and 
Jefferson had been President was not considered a bar to the suit (which 
pertained to an official act while in the Presidency), though on other grounds 
the court declined to take jurisdiction. FSDERAL CASES, No. 8,4n; BEVER-
IDGE, Lim OF JoHN MARSHA.LI;, vol. 4, p. 102. , 
3 These English bills of indemnity offered protection. only for bona fid'e 
acts, done of necessity, and not for excesses of authority. In re the peti-
tion of D. F. Marais. EDINBURGH REvmw, vol. 195, p. 79 (see especially 
p. 90); MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL· HIS'.l'ORY OF ENGLAND, vol. 2, pp. 256-z58. 
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false imprisonment. The official concern occasioned by this suit 
may be judged by the fact that the President adopted the act of the 
Secretary of War as his own, and directed that the suit "should be 
fully defended as a matter which deeply concerns the public wel-
fare as well as the safety of the individual officers of the govern-
ment." To this end the United States district attorney at Philadel-
phia was instructed to give particular attention to the defense of 
Cameron. As a result the case was dropped in its preliminary 
stages.4 
In 1863 Secretary Seward was subjected to a similar action for 
false imprisonment in a New York court by G. W. Jones, former 
minister to Bogota, who was arrested in a New York hotel and 
kept prisoner at Fort Lafayette for four months.5 The effort of 
Governor Seymour and the judicial authorities of New York to 
prosecute General Dix for his suppression of the New York World 
is an example of the same disposition on the part of local courts 
I 
to enforce judicial remedies at the expense of highly placed officials.c 
Secretary Stanton is said to have remarked that if such prosecu-
tions held he would be imprisoned a thousand years at least.7 These 
instances will suffice to show that the need of protection for federal 
officers was real. 
To supply such protection was the purpose of the act of March 
3, 1863, which was at once a bill of indemnity and an authorization 
to suspend the habeas corpus privilege.8 It is only the fourth and 
subsequent sections that carry the indemnifying feature. 
The circumstances of the passage of this act were extraordinary. 
It was considered during the last hours of a crowded session, amid 
a hectic atmosphere. Its opponents claimed that it was railroaded 
through, that various attempts to lay it on the table or delay its 
4 0FFICIAL REcoRDs, WAR oF 'rHE REBELLION, second series, vol. 2, pp. 
507-5o8; ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA, I86z, 5II-5I2. 
5 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 563; 4I Barb. (N. Y.) 269; 3 Grant (Pa.) 43r. 
6 AMERICAN HISTORICAL lli>VIEW, vol. 23, pp. 320-32I. 
7 DIARY OF GIDEON Wtr.LES, vol. 2, p. 2o6. 
8 In using the name "Indemnity Act" to designate the law of March 3, 
I863, contemporary usage has been followed. Senator Trumbull and others 
referred to the measure while under debate as the "Indemnity Bill," and the 
same designation appeared in the headings of the record as well as in many 
other places. CONG. GLOBE, 37 Cong., 3 sess., pp. I459, I479. 
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passage were roughly overridden, that it was passed within an 
hour of its first introduction, without having been printed, without 
reference to any committee, and without opportunity for consid-
eration or discussion. It is true that at first there was practically 
no debate in the lower house and that the measure was rushed to 
its passage within an hour. But later the question was reopened 
by a senate amendment, whereupon a long and animated debate 
followed. This discussion, however, shot wide of the mark and 
was hardly more than a general debate on the war and on party 
policy. 
In each chamber there was a lively filibuster against the measure. 
In the House it took the form of continuous excuses for absence 
in the case of various members on the ground of "sickness," being 
"unwell," being "indisposed," and the like. Mr. Colfax, of Indiana, 
rose to a question of order, and his point was objected to on the 
ground that it had been decided that he was absent! To judge by 
the record, the House was in great hilarity when these proceedings 
were in progress, and the sergeant-at-arms was appealed to in play-
ful mood at various points, but at the same time it was evident that 
there was a real contest and that the supporters of the "'bill were 
displeased at the filibustering tactics of the opposition. 9 
In the Senate a truly rema_rkable struggle was enacted. A vigor-
ous minority was working desperately to postpone the measure and 
prevent a vote, while Senator Trumbull and other administration 
leaders were equally determined, by sharp practice if necessary; to 
outwit these opponents and put the measure through before the 
session should close. It was agreed that the conference report on 
the bill, harmonizing the differences between the House and the 
Senate, should be taken up at seven o'clock of the same day that 
the first printed copies of the report were distributed. The parlia-
mentary encounter (which could not be deemed a discussion) pro-
ceeded throughout the night and early morning of March 2-3, Sen-
ators Powell, Bayard and others holding the floor with endless 
speeches, in which the Magna Charta, Shakespeare, Cowper, Moliere, 
Marshal~ Webster, and other authorities and poets were quoted, 
9 The filibuster in the lower house appears in CONG. Gr.one, 37 Cong., 
3d sess., pp. 1357 ff. The bill passed the House March 2, the vote being 99 
to 44- Ibid., p. 1479. 
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while the friends of the bill used all their powers to keep a quorum, 
prevent adjournment, and acquire the floor for a motion to concur 
in the conference report. During this "debate" the yeas and nays 
on adjournment were taken five times. 
Finally, at about five o'clock in the morning, the presiding officer 
unexpectedly put a viva voce vote, announced that the bill was 
passed, denied the floor to opposing senators who insisted that the 
measure had not passed, refu~ed to ~ntertain a motion to recon-
sider, and, against the protest of the filibusterers, declared the 
Senate adjourned.10 
10 The record reads as follows : 
The Presiding Oflicer (Mr. Ponteroy). The question is on concurring 
in the report of the committee of conference. Those in favor of concurring 
in the report will say "ay"; those opposed "no." The ayes have it. It is 
a vote. The report is concurred in. 
Mr. Tru111b1tll. I move that the Senate now proceed to the consideration 
of House Bill No. 599. 
Mr. Powell. L hope the Senate will proceed with this indemnity bill. 
-- The motion of Mr. Trumbull was agreed to. 
Mr. Trumbull. It is a bill relating to deeds * * * in the City of Wash-
ington. ,,,. 
Mr. Powell. What has become of the other bill? 
Mr. Grimes. It has passed. 
Mr. Powell. No, it has not passed. I want the yeas and nays on its 
passage. It is not passed at all. • 
bill. 
Mr. Trumbull. I believe I am entitled to the floor. 
The Presiding Oflicer. The Senator from Illinois is entitled to the floor. 
Mr. Trumbull. Did the motion prevail to take up House Bill No. 599? 
The Pr(!siding Oflicer. The motion prevailed. 
Mr. Trumbull. I ask the Senate to proceed to the consideration of that 
Mr. Powell. I should like to know-
The Presiding Oflicer. Does the Senator from Illinois yield the floor? 
.Mr. Trumbull. No, sir. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Mr. Powell. Do I understand the Chair to say that this indemnity bill 
has passed? 
The Presiding Oflicer. It has passed. 
Mr. Powell. By that kind of jockeying? 
* * * * * * * * * 
Mr. Trmnbull. I believe I am entitled-to the floor; and the rule of the 
Senate is positive that a Senator is noe to be interrupted by another Senator 
while he is entitled to the floor. 
* * * * * * * * * 
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The measure so passed was not designed, as Stevens explained, 
to indemnify everybody who, at the time of the suspension of con-
stitutional guarantees, had committed trespasses in the name of 
the government, but it "indemnified the_ President, Cabinet, and all 
who in pursuance of their authority (had) made arrests during the 
period of the suspension."11 The fourth section of the act reads 
as follows: 
"Any order of the President, or under his authority, made 
at any time during the * * * present rebellion shall be a 
defense in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or 
criminal, pending or to be commenced, for a~y search, seizure, 
arrest, or imprisonment * * * under and by virtue of such 
order, or under color of any law of Congress, and such 
defense may be made by special plea or under the general 
issue."12 
Mr. Powell. I desire to ask the Chair-
Mr. Tmmb11ll. If I am entitled to the floor, I do not permit the Senator 
from Kentucky to interrupt me for any purpose, or to ask the Chair any 
question. 
* * * * * * * * * 
Jlfr. Richardson. I move to reconsider the vote by which the conference 
report on (the indemnity bill) was concurred in; or is claimed to have been 
concurred in. 
The Presiding Officer. There is a motion to adjourn pending, which 
takes precedence. 
* * * * * * * * * 
The Presiding Officer. The question is on the motion to adjourn. 
The motion was agreed to. 
Tlze Presiding Officer. The Senate stands adjourned. 
Mr. Powell. The Chair is mistaken. * * * CONG. GLOBE, 37 Cong., 3d 
sess., p. 1477. 
11 CONG. GLOBE, 37 Cong., 3d sess., p. 22. 
12 12 STAT. AT L. 756. This section is taken from the Senate bill which 
differed materially from that of the lower house in its mode of protecting 
federal officers. In the House bill all proceedings against officers were 
declared null and void, while in the Senate substitute, the orders of the Presi-
dent, or under his authority, were declared to be a defense in such pro-
ceedings. As Senator Trumbull explained : "We do not propose to say 
that a suit shall be dismissed, that a proceeding is null and void, but we pro-
pose that certain facts shall be a defense to an action." CoNG. GLOBE, 37 
Cong., 3d sess., p. 1436. 
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In the remaining sections provision is made for the removal of 
suits of this nature from state to federal courts (except where 
judgment is in favor of the defendant) and for imposing a two-
year limitation, after which no such prosecution or litigation could 
be begun.18 
It is significant that Stevens, the author of the indemnifying fea-
ture of the· House bill, was not one of those who held, with the 
Attorney General, that the President had the right to suspend the 
habeas corpus privilege. According to· the Attorney General's 
argument that the President had the full power to suspend,14 and 
to delegate such authority to subordinates, it would follow that no 
wrongs had been ·committed, and in that case no indemnification 
was necessary. Therefore the very basis of the bill of indemnity 
(at least in the minds of many who voted for it) was an assumption 
that the President did not constitutionally have this power, or at 
least a doubt as to the legality of this presidential suspension and 
a desire to clear up the matter once for all. 
The act was vigorously denounced in a protest signed by thirty-
seven representatives, including Voorhees, Vallandigham, and other 
anti-administration leaders. These men pointed out that the acts 
over whicJ-i the bill cast protection were illegal trespasses against 
which redress might admittedly be had under the ordinary admin-
istration of the law; that the distinction was not made between the 
zealous officer and the miscreant; that all offenses were condoned 
and all redress for injuries taken away, and that the measure would 
encourage lawless violence.15 
II 
When the Indemnity Act came to be applied in the courts, various 
defects in the measure came to light, and in many quarters serious 
difficulties arose because of intense opposition to the act on the 
part of the state courts. As the military pressure was lifted at 
13 The first three sections, whose treatment falls outside the scope of 
this paper, have to do with the suspension of the habeas corpus privilege 
and the discharge of political prisoners against whom indictments were not 
lodged. 
14 For the argument of Attorney General Bates, see OFFICIAL REcoRDS, 
second series, vol. 2, pp. 20-30. (July 5, 1861.) 
15 CoNG. GLOBE, 37 Cong., 3d sess., p. 165. 
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the close of the war thousands of suits against Union officers were 
brought in state tribunals and prosecuted by state judges in defiance 
of the act.16 In Kentucky, particularly, as the Federal troops with-
drew and Confederate soldiers returned, an intense feeling devel-
oped between the Union and anti-Union elements. The latter soon 
gained ascendancy, and as a result there were as many as three 
thousand suits pending against Union officers by September, I865.11 
Very high damages were claimed in these suits, and numerous crim-
inal actions were instituted, so tbat men who acted to uphold the 
government \vere in many instances facing complete ruin. This, 
of course, was the very thing which the Indemnity Act sought to 
prevent. 
It was alleged that these Kentucky cases grew out of a disposi-
tion to use the courts as instruments for the prosecution of Union 
officials at the hands of outraged secessionists. Confederates were 
permitted to plead superior orders as defense, while such pleas 
were denied to Union men. The people were instructed by the 
leaders that the filing of such suits was a patriotic duty, and were 
urged to bring as many of them as possible.18 
Many of these suits, in Kentucky and elsewhere, were civil 
actions to recover damages for false imprisonment. A citizen of 
Boston, for instance, having been arrested and confined at Fort 
Lafayette for eight days, brought suit against the United States 
marshal making the arrest.19 A Confederate sympathizer in Cali-
fornia who had used grossly abusive language regarding President 
Lincoln and had expressed approval of his assassination, and who, 
1 6 The fact that there should be, during and after the war, proceedings 
in the ordinary courts against United States officers for trespass on account 
of acts done in their official capacity is eloquent proof of the lack of con-
geniality between summary methods and the American legal genius. Had 
such methods been congenial to the American mind, then a definite system 
would long ago have been evolved to take care of such cases. 
17 CoNG. Gr.oBJ~, 39 Cong., Isl! sess., pp. 1983, 2021, 2054 2o65; FRANKFORT 
(Ky.) Co?.n.IONWEAI.'l'H, Oct. 24 and Oct. 27, 1865. 
18 CoNG. GI.OBS, 39 Cong., lst sess., pp. 1425, 1526, 1527. The files of 
the FRANKFORT (Ky.) Co?.n.IONWSAI.TH, 1865-66, contain many references 
to suits against Union officers, and the editorial comment is in strong dis-
approbation of such suits. 
19 Sturtevant ·v. Allen, in Supreme Court of Massachusetts. See CHI-
CAGO TRmuNS, Dec. 18, 1865, p. l. 
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in consequence, was confined for six days at, Fort Alcatraz, sued 
General McDowell, Commander of the Department of the Pacific, 
on the ground of false imprisonment.20 In far-away Vermont a 
man of supposed disloyal tendencies was arrested without sworn 
indictment or warrant and kept in prison seven months on the 
charge of enticing soldiers to desert. After release he brought an 
action for damages against the Un,ited States provost marshal mak-
ing the arrest.21 In such actions the juries would fix the damages, 
though, of course, for errors of law the verdicts could be set aside. 
In addition to these civil actions, a number of criminal indict-
ments were brought by grand juries against Union officers and 
often prosecuted to conviction in entire disregard of the protection 
and the federal jurisdiction provided by the Ip.demnity Act. Such, 
for the most part, were the Kentucky cases, which attracted chief 
attention at this time. A Federal officer in that state, who pressed 
horses into service in pursuit of a guerrilla band, was indicted for 
horse stealing,22 while the taking of horses for the public use of 
the Confederate army, "however wrongful in fact," was declared 
excusable as a lawful exercise of, belligerent right. 23 Officers who, 
under federal military authority gave passes to negroes were 
indicted for assisting the escape of slaves.24 For firing on guer-
rillas under arrest, in order to prevent their escape, a provost mar-
shal's force was indicted for murder.25 Election troubles intensified 
the bitterness, and a nl1!11ber of Union officers were fined four thou-
20 McCall v. McDowell et al. Cir. Ct. of Cal., Apr. 25, 1867. FllD. CASllS, 
No. 8673. • 
21 Bean v. Beckwith, 18 Wallace, 510. 
22 FRANKFORT (Ky.) ColllltONWllALTH, Oct. 27, 1865. 
23 The case was a seizure by one of Morgan's men. Price v. Poynter, 
I Bush (Ky.) 387. See also Commonwealth v. Holland, l Duvall (Ky.) 1B2. 
24 2 Bush (Ky.) 570. 
25 Statement of Representative McKee of. Kentucky. CONG. Gr.OBJ!, 39 
Cong.1 lst sess., p. 1529· In a similar case a Union soldier, whose company 
had been ordered to exterminate all bushwhackers, killed an escaping bush-
whacker, who had been a Confederate captain. He was convicted for mur-
der in a Tennessee court and imprisoned on a fifteen-year sentence in the 
state penitentiary. On ·a habeas corpus petition to the federal district court 
it was held that the killing was not cognizable by the state court, and a 
release was ordered. In re Hurst, U. S. Dist. Ct., M. D. Tenn., 1879. Fim. 
CASJlS, No. 6926. 
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sand dollars apiece for executing a military order which required 
certain men to be kept away from the polls. In_ one county, as 
reported by Representative . Smith in Congress, "the grand jury 
indicted every Union judge, sheriff, and clerk of election, though 
not a single indictment was made on the basis of evidence brought 
in by Union men."26 As a result of these election difficulties, Gov-
ernor Bramlette himself, a man of Union sympathies, .was placed 
under indictment,21 and several prosecutions were directed against 
General Palmer, the Federal commander at Louisville.28 
Officers who were convicted in such cases were subjected to heavy 
fines and in many instances they were placed in the penitentiary. 
If they pleaded the Indemnity Act as a defense and pointed to their 
official capacity as agents of the federal government, they were met 
with the answer that the act was unconstitutional (as many judges, 
of course, sincerely believed) and that no matter who issued the 
order, even the President, no legal protection was afforded. If they 
then sought a transfer to federal jurisdiction, this was denied on 
the ground that no federal question was involved. Thus deprived 
of judicial protection, former federal officers sought military aid, 
and orders were accordingly issued to the various division and 
department commanders to use troops if necessary in order to pro-
tect those who had been in the military service of the United States 
"from illegal arrest and "imprisonment."29 
26 Representative Smith of Kentucky, in CONG. GLOBE, 39 Cong., lst sess., 
p. 1527. 
21 FRANKFORT (Ky.) CoMllION\VEALTH, Sept. 19, 1865. 
2s Criminal indictments were brought against General Palmer for aid-
ing the escap,e of slaves (by, giving passes to negroes), this being a felony 
under Kentucky law. In addition; suits for damages were lodged against 
him by private parties seeking to recover the value of slaves who had 
escaped. In Commonwealth v. John M. Palmer, 2 Bush 570, the highest 
Kentucky court held that the federal government had no constitutional power 
to abolish slavery in Kentucky and that General Palmer could not protect him-
self by pleading an order of the Secretary of War. After the adoption of 
the Thirteenth Amendment, however, the indictment in this case was 
quashed. In his memoirs Palmer mentions a ~umber of suits and prosecu-
tions against him, which were defended without expense to the government, 
the costs being paid from the General's pocket. He adds, however, that the 
government later. took charge of the suits and indemnified him against the 
costs. P£RSONAI, MtMoms OF J. M. PAI,MER, pp. 264-266. 
2a "In consequence of the many and repeated applications made to these 
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To back up the· state courts and to promote these suits and prose-
cutions against Unionists, a particularly defiant act was passed by 
the Kentucky legislature. By the terms of this measure, enacted 
February 5, 1866, to take effect at once, it was made unlawful "for 
any judicial officer in this Commonwealth to dismiss any civil action 
* * * for the reason that the alleged wrongs or injuries were com-
mitted during the existence of martial law or the suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus."30 In a later statute it was provided that 
an appeal might be taken from the decision of any court which 
authorized the transfer of a case from a state to a federal tribunal.31 
The plain intention of this lc;i.w, as its opponents charged, was to 
override the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States by 
means of a state legislative enactment. 
It will thus be seen that the Indemnity Act was failing of its 
purpose, and that the protection which it sought to apply by judi-
cial process was proving inadequate. The problem of making the 
act really effective was in part, of course, merely a matter of assert-
ing federal authority where it was being defied, but, in addition, a 
strengthening of the statute itself was necessary, and for this rea-
son the act was substantially amended by Congress in 1866. Under 
the original law, as interpreted by the state courts, an order of the 
President himself had to be produced in court in order to make 
available the benefits of the act as a defense. This was a serious 
limitation, for many of the acts complained of had been committed 
on the authority of department commanders, provost marshals, and 
other subordinate officials. In the amendment it was therefore 
provided 
headquarters for protection against unjust and illegal arrest and imprison-
ment of citizens * * * who have been in the military service of the United 
States * * * Department and District commanders will most strictly pro-
hibit and prevent all such action on the part of the civil authority." Com-
mand of Maj. Gen. Thomas, Hdqrs. Mil. Div. of Tenn., to Gen. J. M. 
Palmer, Louisville. FRANKFOR'l' (Ky.) CoMMONWEAL'l'H, Oct. 3, 1865. 
30 LAWS oF KEN'l'UCKY, :i866, chap. 372. 
s1 Either party to any suit in any court of this Commonwealth * * * 
shall have the right of appeal * * * from the order of any such court trans-
ferring * * * a cause to any court of the United States, or staying proceed-
ings * * * with a view of transferring a cause to any court of the United 
States. Approved Feb. 16, 1866. LAWS oF KENTUCKY, 1866, chap. 6go. 
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"That any search, seizure, arrest or imprisonment made, 
* * * by any officer or person * * * by virtue of any order, 
written or verbal, general or specific, issued by the Presi-
dent or Secretary of War, or by any military officer of the 
United States holding * * * command of the * * * place 
within which such seizure * ':' * or imprisonment was made, 
either by the person or officer to whom the order was 
addressed * * * or by any other person aiding or assisting 
him therein, shall be held to come within the purview of the 
(Indemnity) act* * * for all the purposes of defense, trans-
fer, appeal, error, or limitation provided therein." (In case 
the original order or telegram could not be produced, then 
"secondary evidence" was made admissible.) 32 
This sweeping provision would correct one of the defects of the 
measure by covering cases where authority for the act in question 
might not be traceable directly to the President, and would even 
apply to indirect or verbal orders. 
Another feature of the act requiring reinforcement was that 
relating to the transfer of cases from state to federal courts. 
Though the original measure was seemingly complete and explicit 
on this point, it had not in fact served the purpose of actually 
asserting and maintaining federal jurisdiction in the face of strong 
opposition on the part of judicial officers of the states. The amend-
ment, therefore, was equipped with "teeth." After conferring the 
full right of removal from state courts to circuit courts of the 
United States it provided that if a state court should proceed fur-
ther with a case after such removal, damages and double costs 
should be enforceable against the judges and other officers involved, 
and in addition such proceedings should be void.33 
III 
In its actual operation, thus reinforced, the Indemnity Act pre-
sented a number of difficult points. One of the grounds of criti-
cism was the extremely wide reach of federal jurisdiction which 
the act provided. From various quarters the argument was 
advanced that the jurisdiction conferred upon federal courts was 
32 14 STAT. A'r L., p. 46, § I. 
33 Act of May II, 1866, 14 STAT. AT L., p. 46, § 4-
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excessive, covering, as it did, even a case of trespass between two 
citizens within a state. In a New York decision the dissenting 
judge called it an extraordinary statute that would "give federal 
jurisdiction in a case where an act, no matter how appalling, was 
claimed to have been done under color of authority derived from 
the President, no matter how frivolous the claim." The judge fur-
ther complained that in this manner· the person, not the subject 
matter, was made the criterion of jurisdiction, while in reality the 
case in point did not present an issue "rising to the dignity and 
stature of a federal question," but involved an unwarranted incar-
ceration by one citizen of another who was not subject to military 
law.34 
Federal jurisdiction was similarly resisted in Short v. Wilson, a 
case arising in Kentucky in 1866.35 A federal captain was being 
sued for the seizure of a horse, and it w~ claimed that he had 
resigned his commission and was a private citizen when the seizure 
was made. The court held that the seizure was "an unauthorized, 
wrongful spoliation without any * * * legal excuse, a mere trespass 
exclusively cognizable by the state court." Congress, it was main-
tained, could neither enlarge nor curtail the constitutional sphere of 
federal jurisdiction. Beyond the constitutional boundary, said the 
court, even the President's act "will be as void as the ultra consti-
tutional acts of congress * * * and an action resulting from it is 
not a case 'arising under the constitution or laws of the United 
States.' " The Indemnity Act was held to be law "so far as it 
applies to cases over which the Constitution confers jurisdiction on 
the federal judiciary," but it could not be justly applied beyond 
this limit. A lower Kentucky court had ordered the case to be 
removed, in keeping with the Indemnity Act, to the United States 
circuit court at Louisville, but the state Court of Appeals reversed 
this decision, holding that the case was not legally transferable to 
the federal court.36 
The answer to be made to such complaints is that in any case a 
right reasonably claimed under a federal act may be made the 
34 Jones v. Seward, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 26g. 
35 1 Bush (Ky.) 350. 
36 In so deciding, the Court of Appeals applied' the Kentucky statute of 
Feb. 16, 1866, elsewhere treated in this article. 
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occasion of a transfer to federal jurisdiction, and that even though 
the act may eventually be found void, yet the question of its valid-
ity, as well as that of the claim presented, may be lawfully deferred 
to ·the national courts.37 The intention was to apply the Indemnity 
Act, with its reinforcing amendment, only over such subject-matter 
as was truly federal, and if it were found that a mere wanton trespass 
had been committed, or that the defendant did not have the char-
acter of a federal official, or that his authority for the specific act 
was defective, then it would be the duty of the federal court to 
remand the case and let the state court handle it. The question as 
to whether federal jurisdiction exists is itself a federal question, 
and the United States courts could be properly criticised, not for 
entertaining the question, but for deciding it wrongly, or for taking 
over a case on the basis of a flimsy pleading which failed to present 
the necessary jurisdictional facts.38 Only in the latter case would 
they be trenching upon state jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, 
these courts seem to have taken due care to avoid applying the 
Indemnity Act as a shield for a wanton trespass of the sort of 
which the state courts alone could take cognizance. 
Another point raised against the act was its retroactive feature. 
Since the measure e>..1:ended protection for orders given and acts 
committed (or omitted) in the past, Senator Edmunds referred to 
the act as "ex post facto" and held that its benefits could not apply 
where martial law did not exist. He ventured the assertion that 
no decision of a civilized court could be found upholding an ex 
post facto law declaring that a past transaction should be guilty or 
guiltless except as fortifying martial law where civil law had 
broken down.33 Without dwelling on this point, it may be sufficient 
to note that the term "ex post facto" properly applies to retroactive 
measures having to do with crimes, such as those which define new 
37 For a treatment of the removal of cases from state to federal courts 
where federal questions are involved, see STANDARD ENcYcr,. oF PROcm>UM, 
vol. 22, p. 788. 
38 Where a transfer from state to federal jurisdiction is sought, the 
plaintiff's pleading- must show the necessary jurisdictional facts, and if a 
plaintiff puts in a federal question which has not even a color of merit, the 
court will dismiss the petition. · HuGm:s ON Fm>iutAr. PROCEDURE, §§ 236, 
237, 309. 
ao CoNG. GI.OBE, Apr. 18, 1866, 39 Cong., lst sess., p. 2019. 
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offenses or increase the punishment for existing offenses. In laws 
that are tru!y ex post facto the retroactive effect is harmful, while 
in the Indemnity Act it was beneficial. In accepted legal usage, 
and in the intention of the Constitution makers, such a law as the 
Indemnity Act would therefore not have been regarded as ex post 
facto legislation.39" Had the act involved a retroactive delegation 
of legislative authority to the President this would have been a 
different matter and the objection would then have rested not on 
the retroactive-or, as inaccurately called, the "ex post facto" -
feature, but upon the unconstitutional delegation of power. 
A very objectionable feature of the Indemnity Act as amended 
was a clause which provided for the virtual coercion of state judges. 
After requiring the transfer to federal courts of all cases in which 
presidential or congressional authority could be claimed as protec-
tion for wrongs committed, the act continued : 
"If the state court shall * * * proceed further in said 
cause or prosecution * * * all such further proceedings shall 
be void * * * and all * * * judges * * * and other persons 
* * * proceeding thereunder * * * shall be liable in damages 
* * * by action in a court of the state having * * * jurisdic-
tion, or in a circuit court of the United States * * * and 
upon a recovery of damages in either court, the party plain-
tiff shall be entitled to double costs."40 
This punishment of state judges for acts done in a judicial 
capacity was attacked during the congressional debate as a viola-
tion of those well-known principles of jurisprudence which give to 
the judge an independent, impartial character and protect him 
from personal consequences as a result of the performance of judi-
cial functions.41 Here, in the very measure which was intended to 
e..xempt federal officers from liability before the state courts, we 
find a clause subjecting state judges to damages for official acts, 
and permitting the use of federal courts to enforce such liability. 
11a• Editor's note. See "Ex Pos'l.' FAC'l'O IN 'l.'HFJ CoNS'l'I'l'U'l.'IoN,'' 20 MICH. 
L. R.IW. 3I5. 
40 I4 S'l'A'J.'. A'l' L., p. 46, § 4-
'1 For the debate on this subject, see CoNG. GLOB~, 39 Cong., Ist sess., 
pp. 2054-2063. 
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The few precedents for such a course are of doubtful character. 
A New York statute then in force subjected a judge to a penalty or 
$r,ooo for refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus legally applied 
for, but this law was unusually drastic. The corresponding Eng-
lish statute penalized the judge only for such a refusal during vaca-
tion time, and Kent, the learned commentator, remarked that this 
law of his own state presented the first instance in the history of 
the English law in which judges of the highest common law trib-
unal were made responsible, in actions by private suitors, for the 
exercise of their discretion in term time.42 
That the United States Supreme Court opposed such a treatment 
of judges is shown in the case of Bradley v. Fisher,43 in which it 
was declared to be a principle of the highest importance that a 
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, should be 
free to act upon his own convictions without apprehension of per-
sonal consequences. In that case the court declared: "The prin-
ciple which exempts judges of courts of general or superior author-
ity from liability in a civil action for acts done * * * in the e...._ercise 
of their judicial functions, obtains in all countries where there is 
any well-ordered system of jurisprudence." The court added that 
such liability would not apply even in case of malicious or corrupt 
action, and that for such misconduct impeachment was the appro-
priate remedy. 
Such a clear challenge, however, had been presented to the fed-
eral government by the defiant attitude of some of the state courts 
that the provision was retained. It was justified by its supporters 
on the ground that a judge who, with all the removal papers before 
him, should refuse to stay proceedings would be remiss in the per-
formance of a merely ministerial act, and would be going beyond 
the limit of judicial discretion.44 In cases of this sort American 
law recognizes the principle that judges may be held liable.45 
42!{tNT, Co:i.n.i:r:NTARir:S ON AM£RICAN LAW (Ed. r4 Boston, r8g6), vol. 
2, pp. 2g-30. 
43 r3 Wallace 335. See also Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johnson (N. Y.) 283; 
and Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wallace 523. 
"Howard in U. S. Senate, CoNCt GLOB~, 39 Cong., 1st sess., p. 2000. 
45 This whole subject of the liability of judges in American law is sum-
_marized in LAWYr:Rs' Rl'!PORTS ANNO'l.'A'.1'£D (old series), vol. 14 p. 138. 
Judges of superior courts are not personally liable for anything done in a 
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Perhaps the most serious objection to the Indemnity Act was its 
interference with existing judiCial remedies for private wrongs. 
Suits were obstructed for the purpose of protecting federal officers 
without any provision being made for the relief of those who had 
been despoiled. This ~ailure to preserve remedies for the individual 
was frequently referred to by the opponents of the act.46 As one 
Senator expressed it, "It is not for * ':' * Congress to declare by 
one sweeping act that nothing done in the suppression of the rebel-
lion under authority and by virtue of orders shall give to the injured 
an action for damages."47 A different course might well have been 
taken, for the injured party could have been permitted to recover 
damages, and then the damages could have been assumed by the 
United States. Thus the officers could have been protected (that 
is, they could have been "indemnified" in the true sense instead of 
immunized) and at the same time the aggrieved citizen would not 
have been deprived of the means of judicial relief. Such assump.: 
tion of damages by the government would have been broadly analo-
gous to the compensation of owners for goods seized by military 
authorities while in occupation of enemy territory or to the prin-
ciple of compensation in connection with the law of eminent domain. 
judicial capacity, and no action may lie against them for misconduct, how-
ever gross, in performance of judicial duties. But many cases are cited in 
which judges have been held liable, as for unlawful commitment, refusing 
to perform ministerial duties, or in cases where judges of inferior authority 
have exceeded their jurisdiction. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, a 
state judge was indicted in a federal court for excluding certain citizens as 
jurors on account of color' in violation of a law of Congress passed in 1875. 
The Supreme Court here upheld as constitutional an act of Congress which 
punished state judges for such action, making the distinction that the selec-
tion of jurors is a ministerial, not a judicial, function, and that in excluding 
colored men because they were colored the judge departed from the proper 
limits of his discretion. It would, of course, be consistent with this decision 
to contend that, for strictly judicial acts, Congress may not inflict punish-
ment or impose liability upon state judges. 
4o At first sight it might seem that the provision in section 7 of the 
Indemnity Act, prohibiting suits after a period of two years, implied that 
within the two years private remedies would exist. Such a supposition 
would be erroneous. The limitation prevented suits from being brought 
after the specified two years, while within that period the act itself would 
serve as an adequate defense against the recovery of damages. 
47 Senator Cowan. in CoNG. GLOBE, 39 Cong., Ist sess., pp. 2020-202!. 
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The analogy would lie in the recognition of public ends that were 
served by the spoliation of the citizen and the consequent duty of 
public compensation. 
A provision of this sort seemed the more necessary in view of the 
general principle that in case of an act of spoliation constituting 
a trespass on the part of an officer, no liability for compensation 
would attach to the United States.48 In cases of this sort, where 
the United States government did not see fit to adopt the officer's 
acts as its own, it was customary to hold that the officer alone would 
be liable, but this sole remaining liability was extinguished by the 
Indemnity Act. 
This proposition of having the United States assume damages 
was, in fact, considered in Congress and an amendment offered to 
that effect.49 It was pointed out that the adoption of this amend-
ment would have been in keeping with the congressional practice 
of passing special private acts to indemnify such officers as have 
been subjected to damages while in faithful discharge of duty. 
When the matter came up for discussion, however, numerous prac-
tical objections were raised. It was urged that the plan was too 
expensive, that juries would commonly grant larger damages in 
judgments against the United States than in actions against indi-
viduals, and that collusion between parties to the suit would result 
in a lukewarm defense and a pre-arranged sharing of the amount 
awarded between the defendant and the plaintiff.Go For these rea-
sons nothing was done to correct that portion of the act which was 
widely regarded as its most substantial defect. 
IV 
It remains to consider the broad question of the constitutional 
validity of this statute of indemnity. The objections above noted were, 
of course, used as arguments against the constitutionality of the act. 
The excessive federal jurisdiction conferred, the denial of private 
remedies, the invasion of the proper field of the state judiciary in 
connection with trespass cases, the grant of immunity for "wrongs" 
48 Wiggins v. U. S., 3 Ct. of Cl., 412; Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 Howard 
(U. S.) us. 
49 CoNG. GLOB'e, 39 Cong., Ist sess., pp. 2o63, 2o65. 
Go CoNG. Gr.oBE, 39 Cong., Ist sess., pp. 2o63-2o64 
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committed in districts not under martial law, the interference with 
the enforcement of contracts, and the retroactive feature-all these 
points were developed to support the frequent contention that the 
act was unconstitutional. 
One of the emphatic decisions denouncing the act was that of 
Griffin v. Wilco.i-, 51 an Indiana case arising shortly after the act 
was passed. Wilcox, a provost marshal at Indianapolis, had arrested 
a civilian, Griffin, for violation of a military order prohibiting the 
sale of liquor to enlisted men. Out of such a petty case the judge 
spun an elaborate argument regarding martial law, war powers, 
free speech, the purpose of the war, and the methods of the govern-
ment at Washington. Throughout this decision there ran an under-
tone of opposition to the Lincoln administration. The immunity 
feature was denounced as depriving the citizen of all redress for 
illegal arrests and imprisonments, for it was pointed out that no 
additional protection was needed for such acts as were legal. There 
was no forcible resistance to authority by the people of Indian-
apolis such as would justify establishing military control over 
civilians, and the use of martial law methods without such justify-
ing cause was held to be in excess of the war powers. Not even 
the President, it was maintained, could have properly conferred 
such authority, and the Indemnity Act could not justify such 
usurpation. 
In spite of many judicial utterances in the same tenor, the act 
was sustained in its essential features by various decisions of the 
highest tribunal. The leading case for the constitutionality of the 
act was that of Mitchell v. Clark.52 General Schofield li.ad ordered 
a general seizure of intangibles at St. Louis, and as a result certain 
rents were seized and appropriated by the United States, thus pre-
venting the fulfillment of the contractual obligations of a lease 
between two citizens of Missouri. From one aspect, therefore, the 
case involvecf the enforcement of an ordinary contract, and this, of 
course, was subject-matter proper to a state court. The fact that 
the seizure had been made by a federal officer, however, opened 
the way for federal jurisdiction under the IndemnitY Act. 
s121 Indiana 370 (1863). 
52 110 u. s. 647. 
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Because of a special feature in this case, the court did not under-
take to decide whether General Schofield had the authority to seize 
the debt or whether the payment to him was a legal discharge of 
the obligation. The controlling fact, according to the court's inter-
pretation, was that the suit had not been brought within two years, 
and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations/3 which was 
a part of the Act of Indemnity. The position adopted by the court 
was that "wherever a suit can be removed into United States courts, 
Congress can prescribe for it the law of limitations not 'Only for 
these courts, but for all courts." It was therefore held that a fed-
eral statute of limitations was good in a state court, and in this 
way the jurisdiction of the Missouri court was not only defeated 
but this was done without any inquiry into the legal justification 
for the original seizure. 
In considering the question of the constitutionality of the Indem-
nity Act the court dwelt upon the purpose of the law, pointing
0 
out 
that federal military officers often had to perform delicate duties 
among people who, though citizens, might be intensely host~le to 
the government, and that acts might be done for which there was 
no adequate basis at the time. Then the court proceeded to say: 
"That an act passed after the event which in effect ratifies what 
has been done and declares that no suit shall be sustained against 
the party acting under color of authority, is valid, so far as Con-
gress could have conferred such authority before, admits of no 
reasonable doubt. These are ordinary acts of indemnity passed 
by all governments when the occasion requires it." The court then 
reaffirmed a former case which sustained that feature of the Inderp-
nity Act \vhich authorized the removal to federal courts. The rea-
soning of the court could be summarized about as follows : (I) the 
Indemnity Act is constitutional; ( 2) that act authorizes the removal 
of cases involving acts done by federal officers to the federal 
courts; (3) this is such a case; (4) Congress has the right to estab-
Ga "No suit or prosecution * * * shall be maintained for any arrest or 
imprisonment made, or other * * * wrongs done * * * or act omitted to be 
done * * * by virtue of * * * authority derived from * * * the President 
* * * or * * * any act of Congress, unless the same·shall have been com-
menced within two years * * * after such arrest," etc. (The limitation, 
however, was not to commence until the passage of the act.) 12 STAT. AT 
L., p. 757. 
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lish the period of limitation for such suits and has in fact done so; 
(S) consequently, since this case was not brought within the pre-
scribed two years the plaintiff cannot recover (or even prosecute 
the claim) in the state court. 
Justice Field emphatically dissented to this opinion. He knew 
of no law to justify a military officer in obstructing the payment of 
a debt due from one loyal citizen to another, neither of them being 
in the military service, nor in an "insurrectionary" state where the 
courts were inoperative. Civil war in one part of the country did 
not, in his opinion, suspend constitutional guarantees in other parts. 
"Our system of civil polity," he said, "is not such a rickety and ill-
jointed structure that when one part is disturbed the whole is 
thrown into confusion and jostled to its foundation." Referring 
to the suspension of the privilege of ltabeas corpus, he urged that 
the Constitution does not forbid, during such suspension or by 
reason of it, the institution of suits for such claims or authorize 
Congress to forbid it. Though admitting that Congress may indem-
nify those who, in great emergencies, acting under pressing neces-
sities for the public welfare, are unable to avoid invading private 
rights in support· of the government, he held that "between acts of 
indemnity in such cases and the attempt to deprive the citizen of 
his right to compensation for wrongs committed against him or his 
property, or to enforce contract obligations, there is a wide differ-
ence which cannot be disregarded without a plain violation of the 
Constitution." Neither the act of 1863 nor the amendment of 1866, 
he held, could properly be construed to apply to actions for breach 
of contract between citizens in loyal states, since such contracts 
were under state jurisdiction. If such a construction were pos-
sible, then he maintained that the legislation would be unconstitu-
tional. 
It should be noted that the principal ground of objection to the 
court's position in Mitchell v. Clark was the extreme application 
of the Indemnity Act (or, more specifically, the statute of limita-
tions included in the act) so that it defeated a private remedy and 
prevented the enforcement of an ordinary contract such as would 
normally lie entirely within state jurisdiction. Both the court and, 
the dissenting opinion upheld the validity of the act so far as the 
protection of federal officers was concerned, but Field considered 
INDEMNITY ACT OF z863 6II 
the order of General Schofield unwarranted and would not admit 
the force of the statute of liinitations as a bar in the case, while he 
also insisted that indivi~ual rights should have been better pro-
tected. Had Congress provided the desired official immunity by 
some method that would have preserved private remedies, the chief 
basis of criticism would have been removed. 
It will thus be seen that the essential provisions of the Indemnity 
Act were sustained by the highest tribunal. There was, however, 
one feature of the act which did not stand the test of constitution-
ality. This was the provision for a trial de nova of the facts as 
well as the law in a federal court after a jury had rendered its ver-
dict in a state court. 
The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution provides as follows : 
"In suits at common law * * * no fact tried by a jury shall be 
othenvise re-examined in any court of the United States than 
according to the rules of the common law." This amendment has 
been interpreted in a number of judicial decisions. It ha\) been 
held that the "common law" here alluded to is the common law of 
England, "the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence," and that 
according to its principles the facts once tried by a jury are not 
to be re-examined, unless a new trial is granted in the discretion 
of the court before which the suit may be pending, or unless the 
judgment of such -court is reversed by a superior tribunal on writ 
of error and a venire facias de nova is awarded. In either case the 
new trial would be conducted in the same court in which the former 
defective trial occurred. On this matter the courts have spoken 
decisively, and it has been referred to as the "invariable usage set-
tled by the decisions of ages."54 
But the fifth section of the Indemnity Act contained the follow-
ing clause: 
"It shall be -competent for either party * * * after the ren-
dition of a judgment in any such case (i. e., in prosecutions 
54 U. S. v. W onson, I Gallison 5; F.eD. CAs~s, No. i6, 750. Judge Story 
in delivering this opinion (in the federal circuit court for Massachusetts) 
wrote: ''We should search in vain in the common law for an instance of 
an appellate court retrying the cause by a jury while the former verdict 
and judgment remained in full force." See also Capital Traction Company 
v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1. 
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against officers acting under authority of the President) * * * 
to remove the same (from the· state court) to the circuit 
court of the United States * * * and the said circuit court 
shall thereupon proceed to try and determine the facts and 
the law in such action in the same manner as if the same 
had been there originally commenced, the judgment in such 
case notwithstanding.''55 
The only other instance in which Congress has undertaken to 
authorize a second trial by a jury in a federal court while a former 
jury's verdict in the same case had not been set aside was during 
the War of 1812. An "act to prohibit intercourse with the enemy," 
passed on February 4, 1815,56 had a provision identical with that 
above quoted from the Indemnity Act. 57 In fact, the Indemnity 
Act was modeled upon the law of 1815 in this respect. Though 
the act of 1815 had ·been denounced as unconstitutional by a fed-
eral circuit court in Massachusetts, this provision was repeated in 
the acts of 1863 and 1866, in spite of the opposition of senators 
who called attention to the matter in debate. 58 
It became the duty of the Supreme Court to pass upon this fea-
ture of the Indemnity Act in the case of The Justices v. Miwray, 
which came up from New York in 1869.59 An action for false 
imprisonment was brought in the state court against Murray, the 
marshal of the federal district court for southern New York. Mur-
ray's defense was an alleged order of the President, which under 
the Indemnity Act would have s~rved as a protection, but the jury 
found no evidence in support of this defense, and a verdict for the 
plaintiff was therefore rendered. When steps were later taken for a 
complete ·retrial in the federal circuit court, the state authorities 
resisted on the grounq that the Indemnity Act (in this respect) 
was unconstitutional. 
55 12 STAT. AT L., p. 757. (This section was retained in the amending 
act of 1866.) 
56 Ratifications of the treaty of Ghent were exchanged at Washington 
February 17, 1815. 
57 3 STAT. AT L., p. 195, § 8. (There are many points of similarity 
between this measure and the Indemnity Act.) 
58 Senators Bayard and Browning dealt with these points. CONG. Gr.oBI;:, 
37 Cong., 3d sess., pp. 538-539. 
59 9 Wallace 274 
INDEMNITY ACT OF I863 613 
The chief point to which the Supreme Court directed its atten-
tion was whether the Seventh Amendment applied to a cause tried 
by a jury in a state court. On this point the court said: "There is 
nothing in the history of the amendment indicating that it was 
intended to be confined to cases coming up for revision from the 
inferior federal courts, but much is there found to the contrary. 
Our conclusion is that so much of the fifth section of the ( Indem-
nity) Act as provides for the removal of a judgment in a state 
court, and in which the cause was tried by a jury, to the circuit 
court of the United States for a retrial of the facts and law, is 
not in pursuance of the Constitution and is void." 
In keeping with this decision the federal control of cases under 
the Indemnity Act would have to be exercised through removal 
while the case was pending or through review by the Supreme Court 
of the United States on writ of error, and not by a trial de nova _ 
in an inferior federal court after the state tribunal had pronounced 
judgment on the basis of a jury's verdict. But such removal and 
review have, throughout our history, proved to be adequate instru-
ments for the maintenance of federal judicial supremacy. 
In its many unusual features the Indemnity Act bears the unmis-
takable stamp of war legislation. The wide range of federal juris-
. diction which it afforded, the extraordinary methods of acquiring 
such jurisdiction, the denial of private remedies for admitted 
"wrongs," the subjection of state judges to personal damages, the 
application of a federal statute of limitations to state causes, and 
the unconstitutional provision for a re-examination of facts once 
tried by a jury,-all these elements of the law are the abnormal 
product of war conditions. The law must be judged in the light 
of the fact that it was originally passed in the very midst of a des-
perate war, and was amended in the face of state defiance by the 
same Congress which enacted the drastic reconstruction measures. 
Extreme legislation was characteristic of the period, and this unique 
measure was only typical of the sort of irregularity that creeps into 
the law during war or other times of great disturbance. 
Urbana, Illinois. JAMES G. RAND.ALL. 
